Of Dowries, Dowers and Dowagers

by Helena P. Schrader


Arguably, nothing is more indicative or determinative of women’s status in a society than their ability to hold and control property.  In ancient Athens, women could not control property worth more than a bushel of wheat — and from the moment of birth they were denied the same food as their brothers, denied physical exercise, denied access to light and fresh air (by being imprisoned in the dark, back rooms of their houses), denied education, and then married at 12 or 13 to men three to four times their age, so they could die before the age of thirty from bearing on average 6 children, most of whom their husband discarded (particularly if they were female) because he couldn’t be bothered paying the cost of rearing them. In Sparta, in contrast, women controlled the estates of their husbands—and they were fed the same food as their brothers from birth onwards, engaged in physical exercise, received a public education, were married in the late teens to men roughly their same age, and generally lived long healthy lives. Today in the developing world, legal changes designed to guarantee women the right to own land has repeatedly proven one of the most effective ways to improve the status and economic condition of women.

For readers and writers of English historical fiction it is therefore advisable to understand two related but very different types of property associated with women in English common law: the dowry and the dower.


First, however, allow me to digress for a moment to discuss the position of heiresses. Please note that in England here were heiress (feminine), i.e. it was possible for women to inherit property and titles. This is not the case everywhere in the world even today. Second, heiresses were not dispossessed at marriage. Their husbands were expected to share in the control of their estates and the heiresses no longer controlled them exclusively, but they did not legally lose control or ownership. Women might, of course, “bow to their husbands' wishes” for the sake of domestic harmony or be otherwise coerced or cajoled into granting their husbandsr more control than was legally required, but stronger women knew how to keep their husbands in their place. Geoffrey d’Anjou never titled himself “King of England.” Eleanor of Aquitaine took the Aquitaine back when she divorced Louis VII.  Joan, Countess of Kent, did not bestow the honor of Kent on any of her three husbands; she retained it and passed it to her sons. Heiresses, furthermore, were not found only in the aristocracy; peasant and merchant daughters also had the right to inherit their estates, provided they had no brothers. Indignation over the fact that boys inherited first should not blind us to the more important fact that because girls could inherit, some girls held very powerful positions indeed.

A dowry was not an inheritance. It was, however, property that a maiden took with her into her marriage.  Anyone who has read Jane Austin’s books knows that young ladies generally had a greater or lesser “dowry” settled upon them and the size of that dowry greatly affected their value on the marriage market. A dowry, however, was never a girl’s property. It was property that her father/brother/guardian owned but agreed to transfer to a girl’s husband at her marriage. In the Middle Ages, dowries were usually land. Royal brides brought entire lordships into their marriage (e.g. the Vexin), but the lesser lords might bestow a manor or two on their daughters and the daughters of gentry might bring a mill or the like to their husbands. Even peasant girls might call a pasture or orchard their dowery. With time dowries were increasingly monetary, either a lump sum paid at the time of the marriage to the bridegroom or a fixed annual income paid by the bride’s guardian (or his estate) to the husband. The key thing to remember about dowries, however, is that they were not the property of the bride. They passed from her guardian to her husband.


Dowers on the other hand were women’s property. In the early Middle Ages, dowers were inalienable land bestowed on a wife at the time of her marriage. A woman owned and controlled her dower property, and she retained complete control of this property not only after her husband’s death, but even if her husband were to fall foul of the king, be attained for treason, and forfeit his own land and titles.

In the early Middle Ages, dowers were usually negotiated in advance of a marriage. Generally the father of the bride and the father of the groom would negotiate both the size and nature of the dowry and the dower at the same time. In short, the father of the bride would agree to transfer certain properties or a combination of properties and money to the groom at the marriage, and in exchange the father of the groom would designate properties as the new bride’s dower. These could, obviously, be identical. I.e. the father of the bride might agree to transfer certain properties to the bridegroom on the condition that they were designated his daughter’s dower, i.e. they were effectively transferred not to the control of the groom but to the bride after her marriage. Formally, however, the groom bestowed the “dower” on his wife at the church door immediately after marriage, and its size was variable.


In the absence of a formal agreement, however, English law came to recognize the right of every widow to one third of her late husband’s property. In this case, it fell to the husband’s lord (for barons, the crown) to determine exactly which pieces of property made up the dower portion after her husband’s death. Theoretically, the husband’s overlord was supposed to make this determination within forty days, but reality sometimes looked different. English judicial history is full of cases where tenacious widows litigated for decades to get their rights, an indication that justice was not always served rapidly, but also that women felt sufficiently protected by the law to take their case to court. The exception here was in the case of the widows of executed traitors. Whereas the older custom of designating the dower at the church door protected the widows of traitors, the idea that the dower was simply one third of a man’s estate at death meant that it was de-facto forfeited to the crown with the rest of a traitor’s lands, and his widow was left empty-handed.


This change in the nature of dowers may explain the increasing popularity of “jointures.” Jointures were not strictly women’s property as they were (as the name suggests) bestowed jointly on a couple at marriage. Nevertheless, the effect of jointures was to protect women financially. Property that was part of a jointure was controlled jointly so long as both partners lived, but became the sole property of the surviving partner at the death of the other. For men, that was nothing new, but for women it meant that in addition to the third of her husband’s estate that made up her dower portion, she had control of all her “jointure” lands. Furthermore, land held via “jointures” could not seized by the crown if either partner were convicted of treason; it remained the property of the survivor (usually the widow).

It was not uncommon in the High Middle Ages for women to successively marry two, three or even four husbands. After each marriage, the widow retained her dower and any jointures settled on her at the time of the marriage. Women who were politically well-connected, already wealthy and/or knew how to negotiate could therefore accumulate vast estates. “Dowagers” controlling these estates were not only wealthy and independent, they were influential and powerful -- at least within their family circles. They often controlled the income, marriages and dowries of their off-spring. One can imagine, they were not always popular but undoubtedly formidable!

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Helena P. Schrader is the author of numerous works of history and historical fiction.  She holds a PhD in History from the University of Hamburg.  The three-part biographical novel of Balian d’Ibelin, who defended Jerusalem against Saladin in 1187, is now on sale. Knight of Jerusalem was awarded a B.R.A.G. medallion and was a finalist for the 2014 Chaucer Awards for Historical Fiction.  St. Louis' Knight was the winner of the 2014 Chaucer Award for Historical Fiction set in the High Middle Ages. Defender of Jerusalem is newly released.  Read more at: http://defenderofjerusalem.com, 
http://helenapschrader.com or follow Helena’s blogs: Schrader’s Historical Fiction and Defending the Crusader Kingdoms.

"Scramble" - Remembering the Battle of Britain and Why it Still Appeals to us Today

by Helena P. Schrader

"Scramble!" RAF Squadron is given the order to
take off very early in the Battle of Britain
Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum

The Battle of Britain was more than a military victory. The Battle of Britain was a critical psychological and diplomatic victory as well. The psychological impact of defeating the apparently invincible Luftwaffe was enormous at the time. The RAF had proved that the Luftwaffe could be beaten, and by inference that the Wehrmacht could be beaten. This fact alone encouraged resistance and kept hope alive all across occupied Europe. Even more important, as a result of British tenacity and defiance in the Battle of Britain, the United States, which at the start of the Battle had written Britain off as a military and political power, revised its opinion of British strength.  Because of the Battle of Britain, the U.S.A. shifted its policy from ‘neutrality’ to ‘non-belligerent’ assistance. With American help, Britain was able to keep fighting until Hitler over-extended himself in the Soviet Union. The Battle of Britain was the necessary pre-requisite for future victory in Europe.

Yet, any such purely objective assessment of the Battle of Britain does not explain the appeal of the Battle of Britain to people today.  There were, after all, many other decisive battles in WWII from Stalingrad to Midway. The appeal of the Battle of Britain is less military and diplomatic than emotional.

Fighter Command Control Room;
Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum

The Battle of Britain appeals to us today because it was not only a clear case of good against evil, but of the underdog winning against a bully. RAF Fighter Command was tiny!  Even including the foreign pilots flying with the RAF, there were only roughly 1,200 trained fighter pilots in Britain at the time of the Battles. (Numbers varied due to training, casualties and recruiting.) These men were a highly trained elite that could not be readily replaced. Pilots were not mere “cannon fodder.”  They were specialists that took years to train. In the summer of 1940, they stood against apparently overwhelming odds. Churchill – as so often – captured the sentiment of his countrymen when he claimed that “never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few.”

This image of a small “band of brothers” standing up to a massive and invincible foe in a defensive battle for their homeland was reminiscent of other heroic battles – Henry V at Agincourt, Edward the Black Prince at Poitiers, Leonidas and his 300 at Thermopylae.  Such battles, pitting a few defenders against a hoard of enemy, have always appealed to students of history and readers of historical fiction like almost nothing else.

RAF Pilots at "Readiness,"
Courtesy of Chris Gross

Furthermore, the Battle of Britain still resonates with us today in part because it wasn’t a battle won by generals, technology or even “aces” — but rather by young men barely out of their teens.  (The average age of RAF fighter pilots in the Battle was 22.)  They fought in beautiful, fragile machines that still awe aviation enthusiasts. And the casualties were devastating.  In just four months, Fighter Command lost roughly 40% of its pilots.  That means that each pilot had only a slightly better than 50% chance of surviving the Battle.  Furthermore, the effective casualty rate of killed and wounded was closer to 70%.  This situation was aggravated by the fact that, as a rule, the more experienced pilots had a 5-6 times greater chance of surviving than did the replacement pilots coming into the front line with very little flying and no combat experience.  The most critical period for a replacement pilot was his first fortnight in a front-line squadron.  Many pilots did not survive four hours.  That makes for an element of tragedy even in victory that catches at our heart-strings.

Funeral for PO Billy Fiske,
U.S. citizen and RAF fighter pilot, during the Battle of Britain,
Courtesy of  Andy Saunders

We shouldn’t forget, however, that the pilots alone did not win the Battle.  The RAF had worked hard to ensure that its pilots were supported by some of the best trained ground crews in the world.  With an ‘apprentice’ program, the RAF had attracted technically minded young men early and provided them with extensive training throughout the inter-war years. In some ways, ground crews were better educated than many pilots. Under the circumstances and given the fact that many pilots came up from the ranks themselves, it is hardly surprising that the relations between pilots and crews were on the whole excellent.  The RAF had a notoriously relaxed attitude toward discipline in any case, and this further worked to break down barriers. Last but not least, at this stage of the war, individual crews looked after individual aircraft and so specific pilots.  The ground crews identified strongly with their unit – and ‘their’ pilots. After the bombing of the airfields started in mid-August, the ground crews were themselves under attack, suffering casualties and working under deplorable conditions – often without hot-food, dry beds, adequate sleep or time-off.  The ground crews never failed their squadrons.  Aircraft were turned around – rearmed, re-fuelled, tires, oxygen, airframe etc. checked – in just minutes.

Ground Crews Refuelling in the Rain.
Imperial War Museum

Equally notable was the RAF’s early and exceptionally positive attitude toward women.  The RAF actively encouraged the establishment of a Women’s Auxiliary, which by the end of the war served alongside the RAF in virtually all non-combat functions.  Even before the start of the war, however, the vital and highly technical jobs of radar operator and operations room plotter, as well as various jobs associated with these activities, were identified as trades especially suited to women.  The C-in-C of Fighter Commander, ACM Dowding, personally insisted that the talented women who did these jobs move up into supervisory positions – and be commissioned accordingly. During the Battle of Britain over 17,000 WAAF served with the RAF, nearly 4,500 of them with Fighter Command. A number of WAAF were killed and injured and six airwomen were awarded the Military Medal during the Battle.

WWII WAAF Recruiting Poster.
Imperial War Museum

Last but not least, given the losses and the sheer physical demands placed upon the RAF pilots at the time, it was their ability not only to keep flying but to keep drinking and laughing that awed their countrymen, their leaders and their enemies — when they found out.  And it still appeals to us today.

Pilots of "B" Flight, 85 Squadron, July 1940,
Courtesy of Edith Kup

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My novel on the Battle of Britain, Chasing the Wind (Kindle edition: Where Eagles Never Flew), pays tribute to the entire spectrum of participants, male and female, from mechanics and controllers to WAAFs as well as to the pilots. I based my account on the very meticulous records now available from both the UK and Germany to ensure that the raids, casualties, and claims each day are correct. Yet the most important research was reading the memoirs of dozens of participants and corresponding with others to try to get the atmosphere “right.” My greatest moment as a historical novelist came when I received a hand-written letter from a man I had only read about up until then: RAF Battle of Britain “ace” Bob Doe. Wing Commander Doe wrote to tell me I had “got it smack on the way it was for us fighter pilots,” and said that Chasing the Wind was “the best book” he had ever read about the Battle of Britain.  It doesn’t get any better than that for a historical novelist!

Here’s a video teaser about the novel. Click here!

For reviews click here: Reviews.

The Air Transport Auxiliary and the British Women who Flew in WWII

by Helena P. Schrader


The Second World War did not explode unexpectedly upon an unsuspecting world. Rather, it arrived with the slow, clanking certainty of an advancing panzer. Practically from the time Hitler came to power until the German invasion of Poland, the world moved inexorably toward conflict. Yet, while the world marched consciously toward conflagration, it did so — at least in the West — with reluctance and foreboding.

The First World War had been won by the Western Powers at such immeasurable cost in both blood and money that it created a profound and widespread abhorrence of war. Even as Germany started down the path of militant Revisionism, breaking one after another of the bonds imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, British public opinion remained firmly pacifist. The policy of Appeasement was arguably the only policy that a democratically elected government could pursue given the mood among voters.

All this explains why, despite the evidence of massive German aggression coupled with the expectation that aerial warfare would be decisive in any future conflict, Great Britain responded only slowly to the growing air threat posed by the Luftwaffe. In 1934, Germany was producing nearly 2,000 aircraft annually; Britain less than half that amount. By 1939 German aircraft production topped 8,000, while British aircraft production lagged behind at less than 5,000. The situation with regard to pilots was similar.

After the Sudeten Crisis of September 1938, the British Air Ministry finally realized that the situation was critical. Among other measures instituted was the creation of the “Civil Air Guard,” whose purpose was to increase the available pool of qualified pilots by subsidizing pilot training of volunteers in a civilian context. Applicants had to be between the ages of eighteen and fifty and were trained at some sixty private and commercial flying schools. The program, notably, made no distinction between men and women.

Gerard d'Erlanger
Founder and Commander of the ATA

Also in response to the Sudeten Crisis, a Director of British Airways, Gerard d’Erlanger, proposed to the Director General of Civil Aviation a scheme by which pilots ineligible for active service with the RAF could assist the nation in wartime. D’Erlanger foresaw that pilots, like himself, who were too old or otherwise unfit for active service in the Royal Air Force (RAF) or Air Fleet Arm (FAA) might nevertheless render valuable service in a support capacity. He envisaged such tasks as carrying mail, news and dispatches, the transport of medical and other vital but lightweight equipment as well as VIPs and ambulance services. The scheme won almost immediate approval and the name of Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA) was adopted.

At the outbreak of the war, thirty qualified pilots unfit for active service were recruited, but it was not until the Battle of France that the ATA really took off. The RAF was stretched beyond capacity. It was losing pilots faster than it could replace them, and every pilot was needed on the front line. It asked the ATA to assume complete responsibility for transporting aircraft from factories to airfields and back again for factory refits and the like. The ATA assumed that burden and soon found that it was too small to fulfill it. The ATA made appeals over the media for older, qualified pilots to volunteer, but there just weren’t enough out there. So the ATA instituted its own training scheme for persons not fit for active service. By the end of the war, the ATA had delivered 309,011 aircraft of 147 different types, and numbered almost 800 pilots and roughly 3000 ground personnel — including 162 women pilots.

The ATA’s greatest achievement was not merely one of helping the Allies win the war by ensuring that the vitally needed aircraft were delivered to the RAF and FAA, nor was it one of relieving healthy young men for combat duty. What makes the ATA fascinating was the unprecedented, unorthodox and creative way in which the ATA mastered the problems it faced with human resources deemed “sub-standard” by all conventional measures. 

The ATA required a previously unheard of versatility of its pilots. ATA pilots were required to fly aircraft they had never seen before simply on the basis of a few hours “conversion” training in similar classes of aircraft and with “Pilot’s Notes” printed on four by six-inch cards. ATA pilots flew without radios and so without the benefit of radio navigation aids, in-flight weather advisories or emergency communication. Furthermore, the ATA initially provided no, and later only very limited, training in the use of instruments for blind flying. Unlike the RAF flying from their own stations, pilots of the ATA were expected to fly in and out of aerodromes they had never seen before all across the country. It expected its pilots to fly in airspace regularly invaded by enemy aircraft without any means of self-defense. Most remarkable of all, the ATA expected all this of pilots who were deemed “unfit” for military service. Flying for the ATA were men with one arm or one eye, men who were short-sighted, men who were over-weight, over-aged, several of these all at once — and (as I said above) women.

ATA pilot "mounting" a Spitfire

The utilization and integration of women pilots in the ATA is one of its most striking successes. Less than three months after the start of the war, on November 14, 1939 the first eight women pilots signed contracts with the ATA effective January 1, 1940. From then on, the number of women pilots grew until by the end of the war a total of 162 women pilots and four women flight engineers had flown with the ATA. 

Even more remarkable, by the end of the war, the women pilots were receiving equal pay for equal work — highly unusual in 1945. Furthermore, women had served as instructors of both men and women, as Operations Officers and as Pool Commanders, all with the corresponding authority over men. Equally astonishing, women had been qualified on virtually every kind of aircraft the RAF and FAA flew except the large flying boats but including the first jet fighter aircraft. They literally faced the exact same hazards as their male colleagues and earned the equal opportunity and remuneration grated them. Furthermore, they enjoyed, without discrimination, the accolades, praise and thanks awarded to the ATA as whole. In short, the ATA is an exemplary case study in eliminating sex discrimination and integrating women into an already extraordinary organization for the benefit of all concerned.

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Helena P. Schrader published a comparative study of British and American women pilots in WWII, Sisters in Arms with Pen & Sword Aviation. The book is available in Hardback, Trade Paperback and Kindle editions. For more information about her non-fiction history books and historical novels visit her website at: http://helenapschrader.com.

Britain's Critical Contribution to the Berlin Airlift

by Helena P. Schrader

On June 24, 1948 the Soviet Union abruptly closed all land and water access to the Western Sectors of Berlin. Over two million civilians, dependent on the surrounding territory and the West for food, fuel, and other basic goods, were suddenly cut off from all the necessities of life.

The Western Allies had the option of either withdrawing their garrisons and allowing the Soviet Union to take control of the entire city, or of trying to supply the city by air. Never in history had two million people been supplied exclusively by air before. Furthermore, the survival of the Western Sectors of Berlin depended not just on food supplies but above all coal to fuel the power plants that kept the water and sewage systems, the public transport network and the factories running. None of the senior military commanders of the time believed it could be done.

But the political leadership in London and Washington insisted that it must be done. A withdrawal from Berlin would discredit the West at a crucial moment in history, when the Soviet Union was expanding aggressively into Europe. Worse, it would endanger the political stability and economic recovery of Europe.

So the largest and most ambitious airlift in history was set in motion. It began without the West really knowing how much the Berliners needed in order to survive — much less how much those supplies weighed. It was launched despite an almost complete absence of aircraft and aircrews in Germany, and despite serious inadequacies in airfields and air traffic control. It was launched without airlift expertise in theater or a unified command structure. But once it took wing, it flew and turned into something that not even its originators and advocators had ever imagined or expected.

And all too often today it is remembered as an American victory. Without doubt without American resources the Berlin Airlift could never have succeeded. The U.S. Air Force carried 76.7% of all cargoes flown into Berlin by weight, and 69.4% of all flights. The United States literally threw everything it had into the airlift, stripping all other theaters of transport airport, calling up all reservists with four-engine experience (both in the air and on the ground) and air traffic controllers. The costs were literally incalculable — just trying to figure out what needed to be included was almost impossible without the lost opportunity costs of investing so many resources in a single endeavor. But not only was the RAF very much carrying it’s weight — it was only about one fifth the size of the USAF at this time —  the entire airlift might never have happened had it not been for the RAF and Foreign Secretary Bevin.

When the Blockade of Berlin started, the Western Allies appeared to have just two options: retreat, i.e. give up their rights to Berlin and withdraw their garrisons, or fight back by challenging the Soviet blockade with a show of force. The political leadership in both countries refused to even consider backing down. The problem with that was that while President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee might not be willing to consider withdrawal from Berlin, that didn’t keep over two million German civilians from starving to death. So the question was: how to supply the city.

The American Military Governor, General Lucius D. Clay strongly advocated sending a heavily armed convoy up the autobahn to Berlin and started pulling together five to six thousand troops to escort that convoy — including armor and artillery. Clay was not a hothead and did not think he would actually have to fight his way across East Germany, thereby igniting World War III. He supported the plan of an armed convoy because he thought the Russians — when confronted with Western resolve — would back down. The British, however, rejected the plan because they believed Clay’s convoy could be stopped without the resort to war. They thought all the Soviets would need to do was blow up a few bridges or erect manned barricades that forced the Allies to shoot first. Furthermore, the State Department agreed with the British arguing that “the Soviets would just sit up on a hillside and laugh.” Rather than challenging the Soviets in Berlin, the State Department talked about blockading Vladivostok or closing the Panama Canal to Soviet ships.

Air Commodore Waite

It was now that the RAF came up with a solution. One participant put it like this:

We were under duress. Berlin could not wait 6 months for a plan, no one had anything else to suggest apart from Clay’s armored column, and RAF top brass flew the first lot of UK-based transport aircraft to Germany … on a philosophy variously described as ‘the British genius for improvisation’ or ‘Limey muddling through,’ according to one’s level of politeness.

(Bob Needham, “Resisting Aggression without War: Berlin 1948 – 1949,” The Friends Quarterly, April 2001, p. 276.)

But this was seen as a “stop-gap” measure. No one believed West Berlin could be sustained by an airlift indefinitely — except RAF Air Commodore Waite. This unsung hero of the Berlin Airlift sat down in his office and started working out some rough calculations of cargo requirements and priorities, aircraft load-factors and the like. He came up with a detailed proposal, and the next day he asked for just ten minutes with the British Military Governor, General Sir Brian Robertson. Robertson liked the idea enough to share it with U.S. General Clay. According to some accounts Clay was enthusiastic. Washington was not.

Both the Pentagon and the State Department opposed the idea of an airlift — and a war over Berlin. They wanted to start an orderly withdrawal. Since this would have to be conducted in coordination with the Allies (and the French had suggested it from the start), this meant convincing the British to pull-out. General Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations at the Pentagon, was sent to London by General Bradley, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to discuss plans for evacuating the Western garrisons from Berlin “gracefully.”

Foreign Minister Bevin in Berlin

Wedemeyer, however, met first with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and carefully outlined in great detail all the difficulties associated with supplying Berlin from the air. His words did not have the desired effect. Bevin listened politely and then responded: “General, I am very disappointed. I never expected to hear the Head of the American Air Force explain that the American Air Force couldn’t do what the Royal Air Force is already doing.” According to Bevin’s private secretary, Sir Frank Roberts, Wedemeyer came out of the meeting “like a Labrador, you know, coming out of a pond” and said: “I suppose that means we’ve got to do it.” And so they did.

The USAF had specialized in transporting coal — absolutely essential for the survival of Berlin because it powered everything from the transportation network to the sewage and water systems — but it didn’t have the flexibility of the RAF to handle children, salt, light blubs and newspaper reels. While the USAF rapidly converted to a homogenous fleet of C-54s (civilian designation: DC-4s) and standardized everything from parts and maintenance to flying speeds and heights, the RAF flew a wide variety of aircraft including the great flying boats, the Sunderlands. As a result, in the end, although the RAF was much smaller than the USAF, it carried a disproportionately high percentage of outbound cargoes — vital to the economy of blockaded Berlin — and specialty cargoes like liquid fuel and salt. The RAF also transported 80% of the passengers in and out of Berlin, and 45% of the food flown to the city. 

In retrospect, however, I think the greatest British contribution was to morale. It was the British who pulled together an Airlift fleet in a matter of just days and weeks, while the USAF scrambled to pull its resources from around the world. In the first full month of the Airlift, the RAF accounted for 42% of the cargoes — or more than twice its proportional size. In August, RAF and British civilians together accounted for 38% of the tonnage flown into Berlin. It was not until September that the British portion of the lift fell to roughly its “natural” proportion of 21 per cent as the C-54 started to replace the USAF’s twin-engined C-47 (DC-3s). Nor should the significance of the return cargoes be underestimated. The contribution to West Berlin’s morale by keeping the factories open, keeping people employed and selling goods abroad labelled “made in blockaded Berlin” is incalculable. It was absolutely critical to maintaining Berlin’s pride and its determination to keep up the fight against oppression.

Helena Schrader has published The Blockade Breakers: The Berlin Airlift. Amazon